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ABSTRACT
Literature indicates that the main obstacle to better manage existing WEEE recycling supply
chain in the developing countries is lake of environmental laws and/or lax enforcement,
particularly in control instruments to overcome the difficulty of informal e-waste processing
firms and its supply chain. Policy makers may rely on new legislative framework to control
environmental performance and the health impacts of pollution; however, this strategy is not
clearly effective as the informal nature of this supply chain blocks the enforcement efforts
and causes the high cost of monitoring. Hence, it is definitely crucial to understand the
interaction between the environmental policy options and economic consideration when
achieving the sustainability of operations across the WEEE supply chain. In this study, we
propose the simplest form of epidemic spreading, namely a criss-cross epidemic model, and
aim to examine the legislative stringency for observing the diffusion dynamics of informal
and formal sectors in an e-waste recycling system. We find that a diffusion threshold does
exist and it is related to the regulatory stringency. Effective population changes dramatically
if it grows beyond this diffusion threshold. In particular, a government agency is able to
layout a minimal regulatory stringency so that the participants of the informal sector diminish
2quickly and eventually cease while the economy remains unhurt. We use a simplified
numerical study to test the proposed criss-cross epidemic model. Based on significant
findings, this paper provides managerial implications for developing the new environmental
legislative framework which is not only feasible but also beneficial to achieving the
sustainable WEEE supply chain.
Keywords: Environmental issue, regulatory stringency issue, epidemiological model,
informal sector-diffusion, sustainable WEEE supply chain
INTRODUCTION
WEEE (waste electrical and electronic equipment, or so called e-waste) management in the
developing countries has its own characteristics and problems. Currently, given on the
different contexts of cultures, the main different status is that the WEEE recycling supply
chain in these industrializing countries is dominated by the informal sector rather than formal
system. E-wastes in the informal system are treated by dangerous and inappropriate recycling
practices that pose threats to occupational hazards and the environment. That is, when
assessing WEEE system, the most main perceived enemy to environmental protection is this
unregulated and environmentally unsound recycling industry (Hicks, Dietmar, and Eugster
2005; Sinha-Khetrival, Kraeuchi, and Schwaninger 2005; Widmer et al. 2005).
However, much suggestive evidence indicates that lack of legislations and/or lax
enforcement is the key obstacle for government agencies to regulate the informal actors and
3its recycling supply chain. Consequently, the tighter legislations as well as new regulatory
framework are viewed as the contributing factors for reforming the informal sector into
formal WEEE recycling industry (Blackman 2000; Medina 2000; Spies and Wucke 2004;
Hicks, Dietmar, and Eugster 2005; Sinha-Khetrival, Kraeuchi, and Schwaninger 2005;
Widmer et al. 2005; Huang, Zhang, and Deng 2006; Streicher-Porte and Yang 2007).
Despite its benefits for improvements, the legislations may not be feasible and become
problematic if the government agencies are unaware of the nature of the informal sector.
Because as the informal firms are numerous and/or well-organized, it causes relatively high
costs on enforcement (Blackman 2000) and furthermore government departments generally
have limited resources for monitoring and control (Hicks, Dietmar, and Eugster 2005).
Additionally, according to Sinha-Khetrival, Kraeuchi, and Schwaninger (2005), the regulated
e-waste management system, like in Switzerland, will employs far fewer people and therefore
has social and economic impacts on the poor in low-income economies. Hence, the new
WEEE management may enhance environmental performance rather than financial profit.
According to Young (2000), the supply chain can be particularly powerful mechanism, in
which enough high volume of waste makes market leverage and then residual management
can be efficient and profitable. Hicks, Dietmar, and Eugster (2005) suggested that integrating
sustainability concept and WEEE management is the key to result in the desired changes in
practice and behavior within the relevant stakeholder. In Linton, Klassen, and Jayaraman
4(2007) study, sustainability concept allows managers to look at optimizing performance in a
supply chain from a broader perspective. Therefore, sustainable WEEE supply chain has
emerged in this research as an important new innovation that helps researchers focus on the
regulatory stringency that may effect economic of scale and environmental performance.
Our research was based on two questions: firstly, how does the regulatory stringency
influence the dynamic diffusion of participants in a WEEE supply chain? Secondly, what is
the diffusion threshold of the regulatory stringency which results in effective population
changes dramatically? We want to understand a specific problem in the relationship between
population dynamics and the environmental legislations; in doing so we may provide
managerial suggestions for government authorities to develop new legislative framework.
We apply the simplest form of epidemic spreading, namely criss-cross epidemic model, to
examine the regulatory stringency as the main parameter for observing population dynamics
in the WEEE supply chain. In particular, this paper tests the proposed model by numerical
study with estimated data. That is because that in general, the data of the informal sector is
difficult to collect or estimate due to the unorganized nature of this business.
This paper is organized into four sections. Following this introduction, the second section
provides further background on informal sector and reviews the relevant literature. The third
section we provide the details of extending the epidemic model into propagation analysis in
sociological contexts. To illustrate the applicability of the proposed epidemic model, we use
5estimated data and conduct a numerical study. In final section, implications of numerical
results are discussed, providing managerial and academic suggestions.
THE INFORMAL E-WASTE SECTOR AND SUPPLY CHAIN
In contrast to formal recycling system, the informal sector is an illegal and unregulated
WEEE processing system. Many actors are in this unregulated processing system that
includes waste pickers, itinerant buyers, dealers, wholesalers, and recycling enterprises, each
adding value and creating jobs at every point in the chain (Sinha-Khetrival, Kraeuchi, and
Schwaninger 2005). In the informal sector, e-waste disposal is treated by an inappropriate
handling technology and facilities, and thousands of people work in the threatening working
condition for less than minimum wages, resulting in damages to the environment and e-waste
handlers’health (Spies and Wucke 2004; Hicks, Dietmar, and Eugster 2005; Sinha-Khetrival,
Kraeuchi, and Schwaninger 2005).
The informal sector in developing countries such as China or India, however, has a long
tradition in waste recycling industry, providing employment opportunities for the poor and
generating secondary usable resources for second-hand market. This unlicensed recycling
system dominates the WEEE recycling market and is recognized as a case of successful
industrial symbiosis which is self-organized and market-driven (Medina 2000; Hicks,
Dietmar, and Eugster 2005; Widmer et al. 2005; Streicher-Porte and Yang 2007). Moreover,
evidence shows that with contribution of scavenging some valuable material would be saved
6in landfills and dumpsites (Moreno-Sanchez and Maldonado 2006). Thus, in practice, there
are economic, environmental, and social advantages associated with informal sector.
Currently, due to EU’s two new directives － WEEE (Waste Electrical Electronic
Equipment) and RoHS (Restriction of Hazardous Substances), governments in low-income
countries have economic and ecological imperative of complying with WEEE international
standards (Hicks, Dietmar, and Eugster 2005; Widmer et al. 2005). That is, there is an urgent
need for some industrializing countries to better manage this unregulated e-waste system.
However, configuration of an informal recycling system is a challenging and complex task,
there are various obstacles as follows, which extend our understanding of role of informal
sector in better managing WEEE management system,
1. The informal processing workshops are hard to manage since they basically are
small-scale, numerous, and geographically dispersed (Blackman 2000).
2. So far, there are no confirmed figures and data available regarding the scale of the
informal recycling businesses, the number of people they employ, how e-waste
streams are in these developing countries (Hicks, Dietmar, and Eugster 2005;
Sinha-Khetrival, Kraeuchi, and Schwaninger 2005; Widmer et al. 2005;
Streicher-Porte and Yang 2007).
3. Without the advantages of lower labor and facility costs, certain regulatory
environment and collection streams, the official recycling businesses find it difficult to
7compete with the unregulated sector (Hicks, Dietmar, and Eugster 2005;
Sinha-Khetrival, Kraeuchi, and Schwaninger 2005; Streicher-Porte and Yang 2007).
4. Due to different contexts of recycling behavior and management system, there are
fundamental difficulties when transferring the European models of WEEE
management into the developing economics (Hicks, Dietmar, and Eugster 2005;
Sinha-Khetrival, Kraeuchi, and Schwaninger 2005).
5. It requires more efforts for local governments to raise people environmental awareness,
improve slow/lax enforcement, or to set tighter legislations and practices (Hicks,
Dietmar, and Eugster 2005; Sinha-Khetrival, Kraeuchi, and Schwaninger 2005;
Widmer et al. 2005; Huang, Zhang, and Deng 2006; Streicher-Porte and Yang 2007).
6. Due to multi-actors in the informal sector, there is a clear need for setting up different
levels of task forces at multilevel governance and cooperation (Medina 2000; Hicks,
Dietmar, and Eugster 2005; Widmer et al. 2005; Streicher-Porte and Yang 2007).
7. Further research of informal system and better WEEE management rely very much on
multi-disciplinary considerations: economy, environment, culture, and society
(Blackman 2000; Hicks, Dietmar, and Eugster 2005; Sinha-Khetrival, Kraeuchi, and
Schwaninger 2005; Widmer et al. 2005; Streicher-Porte and Yang 2007).
From a policy perspective, besides to the discussion mentioned above, viewing WEEE
supply chain from a broader perspective is needed to develop a sustainable environmental
8policy. Consequently, we further review more literature in terms of three major dimensions:
structural framework, recycling system, and impacts, which include ten sub-criteria and are
used to evaluating WEEE management systems in Widmer et al. (2005) study. The main
points of the literature review are summarized in Table 1. The results of impact assessment
are divided into positive impacts on current WEEE management system with symbol (＋)
and negative impacts with symbol (－). In addition, if current situation is contributed to
increasing/decreasing population of illegal processing system, which is symbolized with
(▲)/(▼). Instead, if impact assessment causes the increase/decrease of population of
regulated recycling industries, which is symbolized with (△)/(▽).
Researchers suggest that optimal solution to managing current WEEE recycling systems is
to reform informal sector into environmentally sound recycling system without reducing the
attractiveness of this business. In addition, according to Hicks, Dietmar, and Eugster (2005),
an uncertain regulatory environment and competition from the informal sector contribute the
risks and difficulties of operating legal WEEE processing firms in China. Thus in this study,
we only consider legislative and financial factors as main parameters in our model.
----------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 1 Approximately Here
----------------------------------------------------
THE MODEL
Modeling
9The susceptible-infective-recovered (SIR) model is first developed by Kermack and
McKendrick as a dynamic mathematical model and traditionally is used to estimate
quantitatively population average parameters in epidemics (Murray 2003; Satsuma et al. 2004;
Bettencourt et al. 2006; Castellini and Romanelli 2007). This model assumes a population
comprised of three categories of individuals; those that are susceptible to the disease (S) on
contact with an infected individual; those that are infected by the disease (I); and those that
are recovered from a disease (R). In recent studies, it is extended as an analogy of the
propagation dynamics of computer virus, social traits, addition behavior, etc. (Wu et al. 2004;
Bettencourt et al. 2006; Wu and Chen 2008).
Literature shows that there are difficulties and differences when applying the epidemic
model into propagation analysis in sociological context (Wu et al. 2004; Bettencourt et al.
2006). For example, recycling behavior, unlike a virus/disease, is usually selective. In other
words, that people are susceptible to informal or formal sector depends on relative advantages
of socioeconomic, political, cultural conditions. Moreover, characteristics of actor tend to
influence on social contagion process and result in different individual behavior, while it is
manifestly not so for recycling activities. In spite of these differences, SIR model still can
work enough on behavior transmission of social paradigms. The reasons are the three classes
of SIR model are generally similar to the phases of spread of sociology traits, and the
randomness assumption is appropriate to capture the nature of interpersonal contact between
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members (Castellini and Romanelli 2007).
Unlike the standard population model, we consider the simplest epidemiological model,
namely a criss-cross epidemic model, consisting of only two states in each informal/formal
system: susceptibles (S) and infectives (I). We provide the analogous descriptions of four
states summarized as Table 2.
----------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 2 Approximately Here
----------------------------------------------------
The proportion of population in these two recycling systems may pass from one state to the
other, and/or even transit from one system to the other, depending on relative advantages of
socioeconomic, regulatory, cultural conditions. A flow diagram in Figure 1 is used to
describe such a condition as we noted above.
----------------------------------------------------
Insert Figure 1 Approximately Here
----------------------------------------------------
Drawing upon the literature summarized in the Table 1, when better managing WEEE
recycling system, policy-makers should consider many aspects: economy, environment,
culture, and society. Particularly, we concentrate the legislative and economic factors as main
parameters. The interactive behavior of the two recycling systems is governed by the
following system of differential equations (overdots denote derivatives with respect to time):
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aIrSSS  *= (1)
aIrSSI *= (2)
***** = SaIIrI  (3)
***** = SaIIrS  (4)
where the parameter r denotes a market competition that influences the proportion of
population who moves into the participation state of informal sector, and the parameter a can
be referred to penalty legislations, leading to a reduction of population in the participation
state of informal sector. From (1) to (2), we could observe the population dynamics of
informal sector; on the other hand, equation (3) and (4) describe the population dynamics of
formal sector. The parameter *r denotes a financial profit rate inhered from the regulated
recycling companies, resulting in that people instead turns to the interest state of formal
system. The parameter *a is an encouraging regulatory factor.
The total actors of informal and formal sectors are constant and equal to N and
*N respectively, representing the market capacities of the two markets. With the relation,
NIS = , (5)
*** = NIS  , (6)
we get
0=))(( ** IININ  (7)
0=)( **** INII  (8)
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where
r
a
= (9)
*
*
* =
r
a (10)
The steady states, if they exist, are of (11), (12) and (13).
,=0,= ** NII (11)
and




*
**
=
N
NN
I (12)
*
***
* =




N
N
I (13)
By solving the eigenvalue of the Hessian matrix, a threshold condition *
*

NN
has been
manifested. If 1>*
*

NN
, reaching to a non-trivial equilibrium point is possible. Along the
suggestion of this condition, a government agency is able to layout a minimal regulatory
stringency so that the participants of the informal sector diminish quickly and eventually
cease while the economy remains unhurt.
Numerical results
Below, we analyze the diffusion dynamics of WEEE supply chain and the threshold condition
of legislative stringency by estimating parameters in our model with MATLAB version 7.1.
In order to understanding how does the legislative stringency influence the dynamic
diffusion of an e-waste recycling system, the market capacities of informal and formal sectors,
economic competition, and regulatory stringency were estimated as summarized in Table 3.
Although we consider the legislative and economic factors as main parameters, this study
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only control regulatory parameters to observe relationship between the environmental
instruments and population dynamics of an e-waste recycling system.
----------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 3 Approximately Here
----------------------------------------------------
In Figure 2, we display time evolution of diffusion dynamics of informal and formal
sectors with loose regulatory stringency a=2, a*=2. Throughout the experiments, we set the
scaled market capacities of informal and formal sector to 5 and 5, respectively. That is, N=5
and N*=5. The resulting steady states of participation of informal and formal systems are 3
and 2, respectively, implying the same evidence as the prior researches: under lake of
legislation, unregulated e-waste sector operates well with limited environmental protection
measures and the low level of initial investment (Hicks, Dietmar, and Eugster 2005;
Sinha-Khetrival, Kraeuchi, and Schwaninger 2005).
----------------------------------------------------
Insert Figure 2 Approximately Here
----------------------------------------------------
We also test the impact on tighter legislative stringency with a=6, a*=6, and the time
evolution of diffusion dynamics of informal and formal sectors is shown as Figure 3. The
equilibrium points of informal/ formal participation states are 0 and 5 respectively. In this
case, the regulatory is over stringent and all informal participants are transformed to members
of formal sector. Furthermore, with marginal stringency values {4.8, 4.8}, it can be seen in
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Figure 4 that each trajectory of participation states appears the same trend as the Figure 3,
implying that existence of steady states depends much on stringency of control instruments.
However, it is of great surprising to observe that the equilibrium points of 0 and 5 in
informal/formal participation states are possibly achieved over much more time with
marginal legislative setting {4.8, 4.8}, when comparing to the result of Figure 3. As a result,
considering the marginal regulatory stringency is an appropriate direction in yielding the best
solution to sustainable WEEE supply chain. Meanwhile, it doesn’t bring much pressure on
the developing countries which particularly have limited enforcement resources and financial
budgets. Overall, with the suggestion of threshold condition, the environmental laws do not
have to be enacted blindly so that it wastes enormous social cost or retards economical
growth. Government agencies are able to enact marginal stringency of environmental laws,
which is feasible and cost-affordable to facilitate enforcement.
----------------------------------------------------
Insert Figure 3 Approximately Here
----------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------
Insert Figure 4 Approximately Here
----------------------------------------------------
Taking from different viewing angles, figures 5 (a) to (c) present the diffusion pattern with
threshold of the regulatory stringency. The z-axis represents the population difference
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between formal and informal sector, I*-I. If the threshold value greater than 1, 1>*
*

NN
, the
effective population changes dramatically with regulatory stringency like the lower ramp part
of the figures. On the other hand, the threshold condition for the steady states is 1*
*

NN
, as
shown in the flat red parts of the figures 5 (a) to (c) , meaning that all members in informal
sector have been transformed to formal sector and tightening stringency won’t have any
further impact on diffusion dynamics of members in the WEEE supply chain.
----------------------------------------------------
Insert Figure 5 (a) Approximately Here
----------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------
Insert Figure 5 (b) Approximately Here
----------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------
Insert Figure 5 (c) Approximately Here
----------------------------------------------------
CONLUSIONS
This research uses the literature review as a starting point to understand what the
socioeconomic, political, cultural conditions are for people to participate in or remove form
WEEE supply chain. An examination of existing literature indicates that lack of legislations
and/or lax enforcement is the key obstacle for government agencies to control environmental
pollution, particularly in regulating the informal firms and its WEEE recycling supply chain,
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which currently has its sever impacts on the environment, human health, and the economy.
However, the new regulatory framework offers an opportunity to reform the informal
sector into an environmental sound WEEE management system; it also imposes relatively
high costs on enforcement efforts and is likely to do an irreparable harm the livings of the
poor. Thus, government authorities have a significant struggle to balance the economic and
social benefits and environmental performance when they attempt to develop new
environmental laws. Such a situation highlights the regulatory stringency as a key role in
reforming informal sector into a sustainable WEEE supply chain.
Then, our research attempts to apply an epidemic model to examine the regulatory
stringency as the main parameter for observing the population dynamics of the WEEE supply
chain. This paper proposes a criss-cross epidemic model, consisting two states, susceptibles
(S) and infectives (I), in each informal and formal sector, and allowing members of each state
may pass between either states or sectors. Given on controlling the legislative factor, the
numerical study provides the various phenomena of diffusion dynamics with different
regulatory stringency, shown as in Figures (2), (3), and (4). These figures suggest that the
steady states of participation states of informal/formal sectors really rely on the stringency of
environmental laws. Also the numerical study shows that“marginal”regulatory stringency
captures economies of scale in managing illegal sector and minimizing enforcement effort.
As the result shown in Equation (12), (13) and Figures 5 (a) to (c), we can clearly observe
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the diffusion dynamics of participants in both informal and formal system with the threshold
value *
*

NN
. The threshold condition provides further information about relationship among
the market mechanism, economic factors, and legislations, implying the dynamic and
complex nature when evaluating the feasibility and impacts of environmental management.
However, given the dynamics of population in a WEEE supply chain with different
legislative stringency, our research suggest that focusing on the marginal regulatory
stringency is a necessary condition for developing a feasible and cost-affordable policy.
Additionally, the threshold condition discussed in this study enhances the strategic
importance of control instruments in achieving a sustainable WEEE supply chain.
Overall, the reform of WEEE recycling system in the industrializing countries requires the
environmental sound and regulated processing activities, thus the feasible regulatory
instruments are typically important for the country’s developing legal e-waste recycling
system. Most important, we conclude that considering legislative stringency is regarded as an
optimal solution to develop environmental laws, providing government authorities ability of
flexibility to future changes and improvements with regard to environmental impacts and
financial revenue.
While more work is needed, further research may try to overcome the difficulty caused by
the illegal nature of this industry, and test our proposed model by matching the empirical data.
From a policy perspective, the results based on the empirical data should provide more
18
applicability, effectiveness and efficiency of legislations for better managing e-waste
recycling industry. From an academic perspective, since how to achieve a sustainable
WEEE supply chain is a multi-disciplinary task, our paper suggests more new models needed
to help policy makers evaluate current WEEE management situations qualitatively and
quantitatively.
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TABLE 1
Summary of prior literature
Aspect and
criterion
Current situation/ Impact
Assessment
Reference
Infrastructure
framework:
- Politics and
legislation
- Lake of legislation and/or lax
enforcement (－)(▲)(▽)
Blackman 2000; Medina 2000; Spies
and Wucke 2004; Hicks, Dietmar, and
Eugster 2005; Sinha-Khetrival,
Kraeuchi, and Schwaninger 2005;
Widmer et al. 2005; Huang, Zhang,
and Deng, 2006; Streicher-Porte and
Yang 2007
- Economy - Increasing volumes of secondary
products/components (＋)(▲)(△)
Streicher-Porte et al. 2005;
Streicher-Porte and Yang 2007
- Society and - Lower level of environmental Blackman 2000; Medina 2000; Hicks,
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culture awareness (－)(▲)(▽)
- Initiatives developed by NGOs
and private sector (＋)(▼)(△)
- Different recycling culture and
contexts (－)(▽)
Dietmar, and Eugster 2005;
Sinha-Khetrival, Kraeuchi, and
Schwaninger 2005; Streicher-Porte et
al. 2005; Widmer et al. 2005; Huang,
Zhang, and Deng, 2006
- Science and
technology
- Lake of best affordable technology
and qualifying labor (－)(▽)
Hicks, Dietmar, and Eugster 2005;
Widmer et al. 2005
Recycling
system:
- Material
flow
-Technologies
- Financial
- Poor quality of recovered material
(－)(△)
- Decreasing the load of EEE waste
(＋)
- No securing economic efficiency
and sustainability of WEEE
management system (－ (△)
- Recovered precious metal
materials create the greatest
monetary value (＋)(▲)(△)
Streicher-Porte et al. 2005; Huang,
Zhang, and Deng, 2006;
Streicher-Porte and Yang 2007
Impacts:
-Environment
- Human
health
- Labour
- Emissions of hazardous substances
and illegal dumping (－)(△)
- Threaten working condition and
dangerous processing practices
(－)(△)
- A significant source of
employment in poor residential
areas (＋)(▲)(▽)
Blackman 2000; Medina 2000; Spies
and Wucke 2004; Hicks, Dietmar, and
Eugster 2005; Sinha-Khetrival,
Kraeuchi, and Schwaninger 2005;
Widmer et al. 2005; Huang, Zhang,
and Deng, 2006; Streicher-Porte and
Yang 2007
TABLE 2
Summary of state analogous descriptions
State Analogous descriptions
S Actors are on contact with an individual who is receptive to the informal
WEEE recycling activities
I Actors become participants of the informal sector
*S Actors are instead on contact with a actor who is receptive to the formal
WEEE recycling activities
23
*I Actors become participants of the formal sector
FIGURE 1
A flow diagram of population dynamic of WEEE recycling supply chain
TABLE 3
Estimates of the market capacities of informal/formal sectors, economic competition,
and regulatory stringency
N *N r *r a *a
r
a
=
*
*
* =
r
a
5 5 1 1 2 2 2 2
5 5 1 1 6 6 6 6
5 5 1 1 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8
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FIGURE 2
The evolution of diffusion dynamics of participation states of WEEE supply chain with
loose regulatory stringency {2, 2}
FIGURE 3
The evolution of diffusion dynamics of participation states of WEEE supply chain with
tighter regulatory stringency {6, 6}
25
FIGURE 4
The evolution of diffusion dynamics of participation states of WEEE supply chain with
marginal regulatory stringency {4.8, 4.8}
FIGURE 5(a)
A 3D-view of diffusion pattern with the threshold of regulatory stringency (bottom view)
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FIGURE 5(b)
A 3D-view of diffusion pattern with the threshold of regulatory stringency (front view)
FIGURE 5(c)
A 3D-view of diffusion pattern with the threshold of regulatory stringency (side view)
